A collaboration planning model (CPM) is established on the basis of the idea of supply chain management (SCM) and the cooperative partnership of upstream and downstream in a supply chain. The collaboration among an enterprise and its strategic partners is determined with such external factors as price and inventory taken into consideration. The applications of both Nash equilibrium of dynamic game and bargaining game theory to CPM are discussed respectively. The possibility and feasibility of attaining the goal of win-win and the conditions required are discussed for the cooperative enterprises of upstream and downstream in SCM. The simulation results verified the effectiveness of the model and algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Supply chain management (SCM) is an advanced management mode based on enterprise supply chain. Cooperative enterprises in a supply chain exist in the form of supplier, supplier's supplier, or upstream and downstream. Therefore, the relationship among them is cooperative relationship of supply and demand. The enterprises obtain certain competitive advantages by participating in and carrying out the supply chain management [1, 2] .
The greatest influence of the idea of supply chain management on the enterprise management lies in its challenge to the current production plan and controlling mode. Only by setting up SCM-based production plan and controlling system, can an enterprise change its management mode from the traditional one to supply chain management mode since the operation of an enterprise is driven by customers' demand, and develops centering on production plan and controlling activities [3] . For the supply and demand problem in supply chain management, how to put forward effective planning method of supply and demand is one of those problems that must be solved [4] .
This paper proposes supply chain collaboration planning model, and determines the trade volume between upstream and downstream and that between upstream and downstream and market by methods of bargaining game and dynamic game respectively, thus maximizing upstream and downstream profits.
The following part is the organization of the paper. Section 2 introduces the relation of up and downstream briefly. Both up and downstream planning models are described respectively. A collaboration planning model (CPM) is established by negotiation. Section 3 states bargaining game-based study on CPM. The results and comments are included in section 4. Finally, conclusions are given in section 5.
DESCRIPTION
The up and downstream relationship is very representative in SCM. As far as supply chain is concerned, the upstream and downstream are in a close relationship, which can be described as principal cooperative partnership, especially in an enterprise. Upstream plant is a primary supplier to downstream. At the same time, downstream plant is a primary demander to upstream [5, 6] . From Fig1, upstream faces the need of market when supplying products to downstream, so does downstream. Both sides have many strategies available to select. Therefore, how to take partners' interest and market into consideration and adjust an enterprise's own management principles and plans to maximize its profit has become one of the critical tasks an enterprise's manager has to face. 
Upstream Planning Model
The variables of upstream will be defined as follows: 
For upstream, the optimal model, which takes and as decision variables, can be represented as follows:
Object function （ 1 ） means maximum of upstream profit. Constraint（2）means stock limit of upstream. Constraint (3) means the ith resource (r ui ) limit of upstream (such as raw material, energy, etc.). Constraint (4) means trade volume limit between up and downstream. It shows long-term cooperative partnership. Constraint （ 6 ） means the stock expression of upstream. 
Downstream Planning Model
The variables of downstream will be defined as follows: 
Object function（7）means maximum of down stream profit. Constraint（8）means stock limit of downstream. Constraint (9) means the ith resource (r di ) limit of downstream. Constraint (10) is similar to constraint (4). Constraint (12) means the stock expression of downstream. 
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The variables can be defined as follows : 
BARGAINNING GAME-BASED STUDY ON CPM
Since Nash put forward the theory of Bargaining Game in 1950 [7, 8] , it, as a branch of Game Theory, has made a quick development in the past decade. As for the question of twoperson non-zero sum cooperative game, the cooperation between two players means that they can make a negotiation and reach an agreement. The decision of such cooperation is always difficult to make mainly because ideal or common optimal result is hard to get. The theory of Bargaining Game chiefly studies how to find an optimal or effective or sometimes even satisfying solution in the state of interest conflict. Bargaining Game theory abides by such theories as mutually beneficial interest to solve conflict, and eventually to realize the goal of multi-win [9, 10] .
Nash focuses on two-person game (E, d), where E is a twodimensional plane composed of utility value attained by two players in union, in which
here is compact and convex. There is at least one point u , and
In addition, h, a "dictation procedure", is defined by Nash to serve as a mapping from the point to some point in E, and is Nash solution of Bargaining Game. The "dictation procedure" must satisfy Nash axiom. If two players reach an agreement to get , then both of them can get utility value and respectively. Otherwise, they can only get utility value and
= are referred to as status quo point. As is shown in Figure 3 ., the shadow part of E represents the reachable area which satisfies individual rationality. Rectangular hyperbola is gotten by meeting the following
, where is a group of different constants. Nash solution is the point where the rectangular hyperbola is tangent to E border (as shown in Figure 3 .). Figure 4 .), where , is upstream Nash equilibrium solution based on dynamic game, and is downstream Nash equilibrium solution based on dynamic game. Nash equilibrium solution of bargaining game is to choose some point in , and make it meet the following condition: (2)- (6)， (8)- (12) Both upstream and downstream planning models are nonlinear programming models which can not be solved by simple mathematic programming means. In this paper, the complex nonlinear programming model is transformed to linear programming model first by feasible direction method, and then the common linear planning algorithm is taken to get the result.
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Outcome Analysis
The outcome above shows that, compared with upstream and downstream independent plan, the trade volume between upstream and downstream based on dynamic game is more than that between upstream and downstream independent plan. It also can be seen that the profit value of upstream based on dynamic game is higher than that of upstream independent plan, while the profit value of downstream based on dynamic game is almost the same with that of downstream independent plan. The reason is that in the model, upstream and downstream are in different status, which reflects individual rationality emphasized by non-cooperative game. With bargaining game, the volume between upstream and downstream is, to a certain degree, almost in a balanced relationship, and the trade volume gained by this method is less than that gained by the method of dynamic game. Compared with the outcome gained by the method of dynamic game, the profit value of upstream is, to some degree, decreased while that of downstream is increased. This demonstrates that upstream and downstream eventually reach an agreement. The outcome based on bargaining game benefits both sides and meets the individual rationality and group rationality as well.
CONCLUSION
The paper, guided by the idea of supply chain management, establishes a supply-demand collaboration planning model, in which factors such as market price, middle inventory are taken into account. With the method of dynamic game and bargaining game, the planned trade volume between upstream and downstream and that between up and downstream and market are calculated. In the last part, the paper makes an analysis of the outcome in computational example, and verifies the effectiveness of the algorithm based on cooperative game and non-cooperative game respectively. 
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